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I. INTRODUCTION
Misconceptions abound regarding U.S. certified claims
against Cuba for properties taken by the Castro regime. Given
the probability that the Obama administration may pursue a dif-
ferent Cuba policy than its predecessors, a realistic approach to
resolution of the claims issue requires an objective understanding
of the legal environment and options for settlement.
II. NATIONALIZATION OF U.S. ASSETS IN CUBA
Between 1959 and 1961, the Cuban government nationalized
almost all U.S.-owned assets on the island. Such properties
included 90% of all electricity generated in Cuba, the entire tele-
phone system, most of the mining industry, oil refineries, bottling
plants, warehouses, and over two million acres of land, including
* Dr. Ashby, a Miami-based attorney with Sonnenschein Nath Rosenthal LLP,
holds a JD from Seattle University Law School, a PhD from the University of
Southern California, and an MBA from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. He
previously worked in Eastern Europe for Ernst & Young's London-based
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up to 80% of the rich traditional sugar lands. Expropriated assets
also comprised hotels, commercial properties, private residences,
artworks, insurance policies, bank accounts, and ships. As Ameri-
can corporate and private entities controlled two-thirds of the
Cuban economy, this was the largest uncompensated taking of
American property by a foreign government in history. These
nationalizations were the primary cause of the U.S. embargo that
has remained in place for nearly half a century.
Remarkably, the initial U.S. response was supportive of the
first wave of agricultural nationalizations. In June 1959, U.S
Ambassador Philip Bonsal delivered a diplomatic note to the
Cuban government recognizing "that under international law a
state has the right to take property within its jurisdiction for pub-
lic purposes in the absence of treaty provisions or other agree-
ments to the contrary," and stated that the United States
"understands and is sympathetic to the objectives" of the land
reform program because it "can contribute to a higher standard of
living, political stability and social progress."1 However, the note
also reminded the Cubans that the right to take foreign-owned
property was coupled with an obligation to pay "prompt, adequate
and effective compensation," and expressed "serious concern"
regarding "the adequacy of the provision for compensation to its
citizens whose property may be expropriated."2
The Cuban government responded promptly by a diplomatic
Note dated June 15, 1959, recognizing its obligation under Cuban
law (notably, rather than international law) to provide prompt
and adequate compensation, but suggested that this could be
delayed due to the country's "chaotic economic and financial situa-
tion," and the "imbalance in the balance of payments between the
United States and Cuba."3 The Cuban reply also made allusion to
the MacArthur agrarian reform in Japan as a case model of provi-
sion of compensation in bonds. On October 12, 1959, the U.S.
replied saying that Japanese bonds had been applied to Japanese
landholders, not foreigners, and was therefore not a valid prece-
1. U.S. Informs Cuba of Views on Agrarian Reform Law, 40 Dep't St. Bull. 958
(1959).
2. Id. at 958-59.
3. MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALISATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN
PRIVATE PROPERTY 128-29 (William S. Hein & Co. 1976) (citing Rafat, Legal Aspects of
the Cuban Expropriation of American-Owned Property, 11 ST. Louis L.J. 45, 58
(1966)).
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dent.4 During the second wave of foreign asset nationalizations,5
the Cuban government reiterated that it was too poor to pay com-
pensation promptly or in cash, reinforcing their intent to prima-
rily use bonds for settlement.'
Two principal Cuban laws enabled the expropriations. The
first was the 1959 Agrarian Reform Act, which authorized com-
pensation for property takings related to the sugar industry in the
form of redeemable twenty-year "Agrarian Reform Bonds" with an
annual interest rate not to exceed 4.5% to be financed out of the
annual budget.7 The second was Law 851 of 1960. This law
authorized compensation for property takings of U.S. nationals in
the form of thirty-year government bonds with an annual interest
rate of 2%. For real property, Cuban law allowed for compensa-
tion to include a 15% profit and actual expenses in addition to the
base value for vacant residential lots, and a 12% profit for lots
suitable for commercial use.9
Contrary to most published sources, Cuban law did not
restrict compensation to bonds. Law number 588, which estab-
lished the procedure for expropriating rural properties after the
chaotic process of earlier takings stated, "payment to the owner is
made by INRA [National Institute of Agrarian Reform] in cash,
Agrarian Reform Bonds or certificates thereof." ° Although no
4. Id. at 46.
5. Usually preceded by "intervention" - government takeover of the management
of an enterprise while private ownership is maintained. Under international law, an
act of intervention is usually not considered an illegal act unless it persists to the
point that it results in de facto deprivation of the use of property by the owner.
6. GORDON, supra note 3, at 101. President Batista stole an estimated $200
million from the national treasury, and the Castro government inherited a $50
million budget deficit plus a $1.4 billion national debt.
7. "The indemnification (for property expropriations) will be paid in negotiable
bonds. To that end, a series of bonds of the Republic of Cuba will be issued in the
amounts, terms and conditions that will be set at the appropriate time. The bonds
shall be denominated 'Agrarian Reform Bonds' and will be regarded as government
obligations. The issuance or issuances will have a term of twenty years, with an
annual interest rate not to exceed four and a half percent (4-1/2%). The Republic's
Budget for each year shall include the necessary amount to finance the payment of
interest, amortization and expenses of the issuance." Ley de Reforma Agraria, 17 de
mayo de 1959, 7 Leyes del Gobierno Provisional de la Revoluci6n 135; Decreto No.
1426, 17 de mayo de 1959, GAc. OF., de 04.06.1959 art. 31.
8. See Decreto de Ley No. 851, 6 de julio de 1960, GAC. OF., de 07.07.1960,
p.16367-68.
9. Decreto de Ley No. 218, 7 de abril de 1959, GAC. OF., de 13.04.1959, p.6098-
6102.
10. Letter from W.J. Miller Jr., General Manager, The Francisco Sugar Company,
Francisco, Provincia de Camaguey, Cuba, (Nov. 2, 1959) (on file with the University of
Florida, in Subject Files 1950-1962, Record Group IV, Braga Brothers Collection).
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bonds were known to have been paid as compensation to U.S.
nationals, the American owners of six expropriated sisal mills
were reportedly paid $1.3 million in cash with the balance (50%)
promised in bonds."
III. VALUATION OF THE NATIONALIZED PROPERTIES
The Cuban Government used declared taxable value (the
value of assets listed for tax purposes in October 1958) as the offi-
cial value for compensation purposes. 2 This worked to the new
Cuban government's advantage, as the value of the land was
based on the owners' own assessment for tax purposes. 3 As can
be imagined, declared values were very low, and the amount of
indemnification calculated on this basis did not burden the public
budget. 4 This value was deemed to be the peso equivalent of
approximately $1 billion.' All parties recognized that the market
value of confiscated properties was much higher than the book
value. 6 For example, Chase Manhattan Bank had a 1960 certi-
fied claim of $7.5 million for eleven confiscated Cuban branches,
the bulk of which claim was for expropriated securities rather
than real estate. The last appraisal of any Chase branches was
made in March 1960 and applied only to the Havana office. This
appraisal valued the premises at $165,000, and the necessary
adjustment to bring the book value for that property to market
was stated as $54,800. Fidel Castro declared publicly that bond
payments would range from $15 to $45 per acre, equating to just
one-fourth of the 1958 value of rural agricultural properties.
7
In 1960, during one of the largest of the multi-phased expro-
priations of sugar lands, the United Fruit Company informed the
Cuban government that it valued its nationalized land at approxi-
mately $90 million. In reply, the Cuban government asserted that
the United Fruit lands were worth instead approximately $17 mil-
11. GORDON, supra note 3, at 83 n.53.
12. Ley de Reforma Agraria art. 29.
13. Decreto de Ley No. 588, 7 de octubre de 1959, GAc. OF., de 09.10.1959,
p.22740-43 art. 6. Valuation of the land is made on the basis of the sales value
declared by the owner to the municipality before October 10, 1958. Id.
14. MICHEL GUTELMAN, L'AGRICULTURE SOCIALISEE A CUBA (Francois Maspero
1967), reprinted in AGRARIAN PROBLEMS AND PEASANT MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA,
at 47 (Rodolfo Stavenhagen ed. 1970).
15. GORDON, supra note 3, at 76.
16. See E. W. Kenworthy, U.S. Warns Cuba on Land Reform, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
1959, at 10.
17. Confiscation!, TIME MAG., June 1, 1959, at 11, available at http://www.time.
comtime/magazine/article/0,9171,811136-1,00.html.
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lion (in 1960 U.S. dollars). The Cubans therefore deemed the
property to be worth approximately 19% or less than one-fifth of
the amount claimed by the original owner.'"
In late 1960, the U.S. embassy in Havana (which remained
open until relations were broken in January 1961) was tasked by
the State Department to provide a valuation of American assets in
Cuba. The Embassy relied on book value as reported by owners of
the assets, even though the State Department had earlier stated
the value of U.S. property to be an estimated $1 billion based on
Cuban tax valuations. 9 In August 1961, the U.S. Commerce
Department published the figure of $956 million as the value of
American property taken by the Cuban government. ° This
amount was published by the Wall Street Journal, New York
Times, Time Magazine and other domestic and international
media.
IV. THE U.S. CUBAN CLAIMS PROGRAM
In 1964, the U.S. Congress established a Cuban Claims Pro-
gram, authorizing the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
(FCSC), a unit of the U.S. Justice Department, to consider claims
of U.S. nationals against the government of Cuba for their prop-
erty losses. The certification process was an ex parte evidentiary
proceeding before the FCSC, and the claimant had to submit docu-
mentary evidence regarding the confiscated underlying assets in
order to prove value. The FCSC evaluated the validity and
amounts of property claims, and its findings were certified to the
Secretary of State for possible use in future negotiations with the
Cuban government.
Of the 8,816 claims filed, the FCSC certified 5,911 as valid
and worth $1.82 billion. Although the Cuban Claims Act did not
expressly authorize the inclusion of interest in the amount
allowed, the FCSC determined that simple interest at a 6% rate
should be included as part of the value of the claims it certified.2
18. Interview with Mark Entwistle, former Canadian ambassador to Cuba (Oct. 2,
2008).
19. GORDON, supra note 3, at 101 n.106.
20. Samuel Pizer & Frederick Cutler, United States Assets and Investments
Abroad: Private Capital Outflow at Peak in 1960 Earning Score Broad Advance, SURv.
CURRENT Bus. 20, 22-23 tbl.3 (1961).
21. FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE CUBAN CLAIMS
PROGRAM 127 (1972), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/fcsc/cubanclaimsreport-lof2.
pdf.
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V. CUBA'S LEGAL POSITION ON U.S. CLAIMS
The Cuban Government has never repudiated the U.S. claims
although it has consistently stated that it does not recognize the
property claims of Cuban exiles in the United States.22 Cuba rec-
ognizes its obligation under international law to provide compen-
sation to U.S. nationals whose assets were taken. However, it
does not recognize the FCSC valuation or the interest allowance. 2
Cuba's policy is that it stands "ready to negotiate, on an equal
footing, compensation for approximately 6,000 U.S. businesses
and citizens affected by the nationalization legislation and to seek
an arrangement that would also take into account the extremely
serious economic and human damage inflicted on Cuba by the
blockade."24
The Cuban government's position is that the nationalization
carried out after the 1959 revolution was not confiscation. Under
Cuban law, confiscation is deemed to be an accessory penalty
stemming from an offence in which the perpetrator is held
accountable through his property, and hence, no compensation is
provided. On the contrary, nationalization is considered an act
stemming from an economic claim on grounds of public utility,
social or national interest or popular benefit, and is to be
accompanied by appropriate compensation as provided for in
Cuba's Constitution. Accordingly, U.S. property in Cuba was held
to be nationalized rather than confiscated and therefore
compensable. .25
VI. SETTLEMENT ATTEMPTS
The decades-old question has been: if the Cuban government
recognizes the validity of the U.S. claims, why has it not met the
requirement under international law for "prompt, adequate and
effective" compensation, thereby removing legal encumbrances on
the nationalized assets? The U.S. government's position is that
Cuba has never been serious about compensating American own-
22. Ley de Reafirmaci6n de la Dignidad y Soberania (Ley 80), 24 de diciembre de
1996, 36 I.L.M. 472 (1997). For the complete text of Ley 80 online see http://www.cu-
bavsbloqueo.cu/cubavsbloqueo/leyantidoto.htm.
23. Ley de la Inversi6n Extranjera (Ley 77), 5 de Septiembre de 1995, available at
http://www.icap.cu/medidas/inversion-extranj.html; see also Matias F. Travieo-Diaz
& Armando A. Musa, Cat on a Hot Tin Roof The Status of Current Foreign Investors
in a Post-Transition Cuba, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 885 (2005).
24. WTO, Minutes of the Feb. 1, 2002 Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body, available at http://www.wto.orgenglish/news-elnews02_e/dsb_01feb02_e.htm.
25. Id.
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ers of expropriated properties. In reality, the Cuban government
has made repeated attempts to settle the claims, but the U.S. gov-
ernment has refused to negotiate and has intervened in attempts
by private claimants to negotiate a settlement.
In September 1959, representatives of owners of the largest
U.S. sugar properties in Cuba met in Washington DC with U.S.
government officials. The meeting was called to discuss the offer
of Agrarian Reform Bonds as compensation for their nationalized
assets. The sugar interests were advised that the U.S. govern-
ment considered the offer of bonds to be inadequate, especially as
the expropriated properties had not been properly valued and no
bonds had been printed. Reportedly, a senior government official
suggested that the bonds offer be rejected, as the Castro regime
could not remain in power for long.26 Corporate counsel present
expressed the concern that accepting bonds would constitute an
accord and satisfaction, which could render the assets irretriev-
ably lost even if the Cuban government was overthrown. The par-
ticipants agreed not to deal with the Cubans and promised to keep
the meeting secret.27
However, following this meeting some major U.S. sugar com-
panies continued to consider whether to accept bonds as compen-
sation. For example, in early November 1959, attorneys
representing American Sugar Company (subsequently Amstar
Corporation), Manati Sugar Company, Francisco Sugar Company,
and United Fruit Company met to discuss the need to answer
shareholders' concerns that they had not pursued legal remedies
"as far as we can." One approach suggested was to accept the
bonds "on account" - i.e. as security for a claim rather than com-
pensation for nationalized assets. It was concluded that if all judi-
cial remedies were exhausted they would "probably decide to
accept the bonds stating that they [did] so under duress." How-
ever, because the doctrine of payment under protest was "appar-
ently not well developed under Cuban law," it was agreed that no
final decision could be taken until it was better understood "what
the Cuban law is on taking these bonds in payment."2 In the end,
no bonds were taken in compensation by U.S. claimants.
26. Indicating that the "Operation 40" program of subversive operations against
Cuba was already being planned.
27. Interviews with members of the Joint Corporate Committee on Cuban Claims
(Sept. 27, 2006, Mar. 4, 2007, Nov. 18, 2007).
28. Memorandum from Francisco Sugar Company, Re: Agrarian Reform (Nov. 2,
1959) (on file with the University of Florida, Subject Files 1950-1962, Record Group
IV, Braga Brothers Collection).
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In early December 1959, Cuba's Foreign Minister indicated
that his government was willing to commence negotiations
regarding compensation for nationalized U.S. properties.29 The
U.S. rebuffed this overture, probably because by this time the CIA
was actively planning to depose Fidel Castro.
Cuban settlement efforts persisted. In a Note dated February
29, 1960, Cuba proposed that full negotiations on bilateral issues,
including compensation for expropriation, should begin through
diplomatic channels with the condition that, while these were
going on, the U.S. government should not adopt any unilateral
measures that might prejudice negotiations or cause damage to
Cuba, her people, or her economy.30 An ad hoc Cuban negotiating
delegation had already been appointed by Castro to go to Wash-
ington "with full powers" for these talks. The U.S. government
formally refused this condition by Note the same day declaring
that the U.S. "must remain free, in the exercise of its sovereignty,
to take whatever steps it deems necessary." Throughout 1959 and
1960 the consistent Cuban reply to all U.S. protests about agra-
rian confiscations reiterated the offer to use bonds as compensa-
tion, while the U.S. continued to demand immediate cash
payment.31
In March 1964 Fidel Castro made a secret offer to the U.S.
government via the Swiss ambassador to pay $1 billion in compen-
sation for expropriated American properties and to release all
political prisoners in exchange for restoring the Cuban sugar
quota.2 While this offer made it as far as the White House, it was
dismissed without any acknowledgment to the Cuban govern-
ment. Despite the fact that the offer followed both the failed Bay
of Pigs Operation and the Cuban Missile Crisis (which resulted in
a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba), the U.S. government's internal
position was "Castro won't last," and thus settling the claims
would prevent the restitution of U.S. assets when the Cuban gov-
ernment was toppled.
During the author's service with the U.S. Commerce Depart-
29. GORDON, supra note 3, at 83.
30. The Cuban government was probably aware through the Soviet KGB that U.S.
clandestine operations against Cuba were being planned at this time.
31. Interview with Mark Entwistle, former Canadian ambassador to Cuba (Oct. 2,
2008).
32. Outstanding Claims Against Cuba: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Int'l
Econ. Policy and Trade and on Inter-Am. Aff. of the Comm. on Foreign Aff., 96th Cong.
9 (1979) (statement of John A. Cypher, Jr., Assistant to the President, King Ranch,
Inc., and member of the Joint Corporate Committee on Cuban Claims).
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ment from 1987 to 1990 he regularly met with Cuban government
representatives on official business. During these sessions the
Cuban government expressed its interest in negotiating a settle-
ment of U.S. claims for nationalized assets. These gestures were
reported to and discussed with the National Security Counsel and
the Department of State, but were deemed not worthy of an offi-
cial response.3
In the 1990s several private owners of U.S. Certified Claims
visited Cuba under licenses from the U.S. Treasury Department to
negotiate compensation with the Cuban government. While the
Cubans reportedly negotiated in good faith, the deals were
aborted due to political pressure from the U.S. government. These
negotiations support the proposition that the Cuban government
is willing to negotiate with private claims owners outside of a
state-to-state bilateral settlement mechanism.
More recently, Cuba's Law Number 80 of 1996 reaffirmed,
"the disposition of the Government of the Republic of Cuba,
expressed in the nationalization laws implemented more than
thirty five years ago, in relation to the adequate and just compen-
sation for the expropriated goods of persons and corporations
which had U.S. citizenship or nationality at that time. . . ." While
stating that "the compensation claims for the nationalization of
said properties should be examined," the law links this to "com-
pensation to which the Cuban State and People have a right.., as
a result of damages caused by the blockade" and "all types of
aggression by the U.S. Government" (which the Cubans consider
to include the Bay of Pigs invasion and various covert operations
such as the bombing of a Cubana airliner by CIA-linked anti-Cas-
tro exiles in 1976).
34
Cuba also expropriated the assets of most U.S. allies during
the 1960s. 5 These nationalizations were eventually compensated,
generally for a fraction of the original value of the properties. For
example, Spanish claims were valued at $350 million but were
ultimately settled for about $40 million in 1994, nearly thirty
33. The author served as Director of the Office of Mexico and the Caribbean,
Bureau of International Economic Policy, International Trade Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce.
34. Ley de Reafirmaci6n de la Dignidad y Soberania (Ley 80), 24 de diciembre de
1996, 36 I.L.M. 472 (1997).
35. All of which currently have normal relations with Cuba, including large-scale
investments.
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years after nationalization took place. 6 When Cuba and Canada
settled the compensation claims in a government-to-government
lump sum agreement in 1980, Cuba paid only CAD $875,000
(approximately US $736,750 in 1980 dollars), payable by check in
installments over several years. By any valuation, the settle-
ment amounted to a mere fraction of a cent as a symbolic gesture,
the cash value of which was diminished even further by deferred
payment over time.
VII. STATUS OF THE CLAIMS UNDER US LAW
Under Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of
1949, provision was only made for the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission to determine the validity and amounts of any individ-
ual and corporate U.S. claims against Cuba. The Commission was
required to certify its findings to the Secretary of State for "possi-
ble use" (emphasis added) in future settlement negotiations with
the Government of Cuba." Claims are certified in terms of money
damages owed by the Cuban government and do not purport to
represent interests in, or to be secured by, any particular property
- real or personal, tangible or intangible - situated in Cuba or
owned or possessed by the Cuban government or Cuban nationals.
A U.S. certified claim is a chose in action: an intangible personal
property right recognized and protected by the law, which has no
existence apart from recognition given by the law, or which con-
fers no present possession of a tangible object. 9
In July 2008 the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of For-
eign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a Notice stating that it
"regards" an FCSC-certified claim against Cuba as property in
which Cuba has an interest, the sale or transfer of which would be
generally prohibited without OFAC authorization. It is reasona-
ble to assume that the OFAC Notice was a politically motivated
attempt by the Bush Administration to "chill" claims acquisition
transactions across the board. The OFAC Notice constituted a
36. See Cuba to Compensate Spaniards for Property Seizures, REUTERS, Feb. 15,
1994, available at LEXIS, World Library, Textline File.
37. Agreement Relating to the Settlement of Canadian Claims, Can.-Cuba, June
26, 1981, 1981 Can. T.S. No. 18.
38. The portion of this statute relating to Cuban claims is codified at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 1643-1643 et seq., though a number of Cuban claims certified in 2005-06 were
processed under a different provision, 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a)(1)(C). U.S. Department of
Justice, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Cuban Claims Programs, http://
www.usdoj.gov/fcsc/cubanclaims.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2009).
39. See 73 C.J.S. Property § 5 (2008).
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general and unsolicited regulatory interpretation by a federal
agency and is not U.S. law per se.
A review of the enabling legislation discloses no direct delega-
tion of authority to Justice or Treasury to promulgate specific reg-
ulations. If this analysis is correct, the 31 C.F.R § 515 regulations
are interpretative, not legislative. Hence, their validity is subject
to the Supreme Court's Chevron test: they need not amount to an
abuse of administrative discretion and therefore are tested by the
lower standard of reasonableness." Such an interpretation by
OFAC hardly seems reasonable, given a 1981 decision by the
Supreme Court regarding U.S. certified claims. In Dames &
Moore v. Regan, the Court stated that "[tihe claims of American
citizens against Iran are not in themselves transactions involving
Iranian property or efforts to exercise any rights with respect to
such property."41 Thus by analogy, it would appear that claims
against Cuba are not in themselves property in which Cuba has
an interest. The OFAC Notice also contradicts a contemporary
policy statement by the Chairman of the FCSC that "[ilt is not
illegal to sell or purchase these claims."42
VIII. HELMS-BURTON AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH AUTHORITY
The 1996 Libertad Act (hereinafter "Helms-Burton"43 ) is the
controlling legislation regarding U.S.-Cuban relations.4 Title III
of Helms-Burton states:
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and for
purposes of this title only, any claim against the Cuban
Government shall not be deemed to be an interest in prop-
erty the transfer of which to a United States national
required before the enactment of this Act, or requires after
the enactment of this Act, a license issued by, or the per-
mission of, any agency of the United States45
Although Title III per se is currently suspended by the U.S. Presi-
40. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
41. 453 U.S. 654, 675 (1981).
42. Billy House, U.S. Wary of Push to Buy Claims to Confiscated Property in Cuba,
TAMPA TRIB., June 17, 2008, available at http://www2.tbo.com/content/2008/jun/17/na-
speculators-seeking-to-purchase-cuba-claims/ (quoting Mauricio Tamargo, Chairman
of the US Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, U.S. Department of Justice).
43. U.S. Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and U.S. Representative Dan
Burton (R-Indiana) co-sponsored Helms-Burton on February 9, 1995.
44. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms-
Burton), Pub. L. No. 104-14, 110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2000)).
45. Id. at § 302(a)(7)(B).
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dent, the Executive suspension is considered to refer to the provi-
sion that permits American nationals with claims to compensation
for property expropriated by Cuba, under certain conditions, to
bring suit in U.S. courts against persons who "traffic" in such
property. This does not invalidate the legislative intent to exempt
Certified Claims against Cuba from the licensing requirement.
The OFAC Notice regarding the licensing requirement for
U.S. Certified Claims could presumably be rescinded by the Exec-
utive Office of the President. In 1999, Ambassador James Dob-
bins, National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for
Interamerican Affairs in the Clinton administration said that in
the NSC's interpretation Helms-Burton merely delineated where
a president could alter embargo-related licensing as required.
Phillip Brenner reported, "Helms-Burton codified the
embargo and at the same time, it codified the President's licensing
power. That is, it codified a process by which there was an
embargo to which exceptions could be granted on a case-by-case
basis by the President."46 Richard Nuccio, another senior Cuban
policy advisor in the Clinton Administration stated:
When President Clinton signed the Helms-Burton law, his
administration issued a statement saying that it does not
restrict the right of the executive branch to make foreign
policy. In its own view, the administration has the legal
authority to make any changes in the embargo that involve
regulatory powers, and that is just about everything.47
IX. OPTIONS FOR SETTLEMENT
Holders of U.S. Certified Claims against Cuba will likely have
only three options for settlement:
1. Litigation in a Cuban court
2. Bilateral Property Claims Settlement Tribunal
3. Special Purpose Funds
A. Litigation in a Cuban Court
While Cuban law would allow a U.S. citizen to bring an action
for compensation in a Cuban court, current U.S. regulations would
46. Philip Brenner, Washington Loosens the Knot, 32 NACLA REPORT ON THE AM.
1, 42 (1999).
47. Richard Nuccio, US Policy Toward Cuba is Schizophrenic, Bus. WK., Oct. 27,
1999, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/oct1999/nf91O27d.
htm.
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require an OFAC license for travel to Havana for this purpose.
Even if a license were granted, the claim holder would be required
to engage local counsel and endure a lengthy and expensive litiga-
tion process to establish legal rights to compensation, followed by
valuation of the claim by the Cuban government. If the action
proved successful, the plaintiff would almost certainly receive
bonds in compensation for the assets taken half a century ago.
Under current U.S. law, it would be illegal to receive Cuban sover-
eign bonds as payment, as these would be deemed "an interest in
Cuban property."'
B. Bilateral Property Claims Settlement Tribunal
Under Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the President has
the authority to settle U.S. Certified Claims with the Republic of
Cuba on behalf of any American claimant, for any amount and
under any terms whatsoever.49 Federal courts have held this
"Doctrine of Espousal" to effectively supersede the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibition against the taking of private property without
due process of law or just compensation, to be binding upon the
claimants, and to be the sole remedy even when the amount is a
fraction of the certified value.5°
The U.S. government has rarely negotiated a settlement that
truly meets the requirement under international law for "prompt,
adequate and effective" compensation for expropriation by a for-
eign government. 1 Precedent shows that U.S. courts defer to the
Executive Branch's prerogative to sacrifice bona fide fair compen-
sation to claimants in order to normalize diplomatic relations with
the expropriating foreign government.
Of all the past forty-three claims settlement programs con-
cluded by the US government, very few provided compensation for
the full certified amount of the confiscated asset - and none paid
48. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.311(a) (2003).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 213
(1981); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-81 (1981).
50. See Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 247 (Cl. Ct. 1983),
affd, 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
51. See BuRNs H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY
LuMiP SUM AGREEMENTS, 1975-1995 77 (The Procedural Aspects of Int'l Law
Monograph Series Vol. 23 1999); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative
Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated Property in Post-Castro Cuba, in
CUBA TRANSITION PROJECT: EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES IN A POST-CASTRO CUBA: Two
VIEwS 63 (2003), available at http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/ResearchStudies/
Expropriated%2OProperties.pdf.
52. See Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. at 247-48.
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the full amount of interest." Except in one instance - Vietnam -
none of the post-1975 international settlement agreements pro-
vide for any interest - not even nominal interest - from either the
date of claim accrual or the date of settlement to the date of final
redress. "Such interest as has been paid to claimants appears to
have been made in the sole discretion of the national claims com-
missions charged to adjudicate their claims, sometimes under the
color of international legal principle."54
In October 2007 the U.S. government issued a report recom-
mending a model for a property claims settlement mechanism
between Cuba and the United States.5 Such a Bilateral Property
Claims Settlement Tribunal would be similar to the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal, an international arbitral tribunal located in the
Hague, which took many years to resolve outstanding claims for
assets nationalized by Iran.
Bilateral settlement negotiations with Cuba would similarly
be a protracted process.56 The Cuban government emphatically
does not agree with the valuations of the FCSC, which were not
established in adversarial proceedings. FCSC certification con-
sisted of administrative hearings in which only the claimants
introduced evidence on the extent and value of their losses.57 The
total amount certified by the FCSC is almost double the $956 mil-
lion book value of all U.S. investments in Cuba as reported in
1961.
Cuban emphasis on using declared taxable value as an
appraisal basis would find support not only in the published
report by the Bureau of Economic Analysis but also in decisions by
U.S. federal courts. For example, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, Chase argued that the value of its expro-
priated assets (branches in Cuba) should be applied to set off the
amount of a claim against it by the Cuban government for unpaid
53. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT CoMm., 2006
ANN. REP. Section IV: Table of Completed Programs, available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/fcsc/06rpt/section6.htm; id., at Section I.B., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/fcscl
06rpt/annrepO6.htm ("In most programs, the amount of funds available to pay the
Commission's awards is limited, often resulting in pro rata payments of awards.").
54. See WESTON, supra note 51, at 81.
55. U.S. AGENCY INT'L DEV. ET. AL. REPORT ON THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING
PROPERTY CLAIMS BETWEEN CUBA & THE UNITED STATES 38 (2007) [hereinafter
USAID REPORT ON THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING PROPERTY CLAIMS].
56. Settlement of U.S. nationalization claims against China and Vietnam took
approximately nine years each.
57. See 45 C.F.R. part 531. See generally MATIAS F. TRAVIESo-DIAz, THE LAWS AND
LEGAL SYSTEM OF A FREE-MARKET CUBA: A PROSPECTUS FOR BUSINESS (1996).
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letters of credit - thus the court addressed the issue of valuation
of such assets.5" Chase argued that the value of its expropriated
branches should include "going concern value" (i.e., a premium
over the net asset or "book value" which takes into account future
earnings and good will). Although the Circuit Court specifically
acknowledged that the FCSC ruled that Chase had a valid claim
for "going concern value," it did not agree and nonetheless held
that such ruling "takes insufficient account of the acknowledged
state of the Cuban economy following the revolution." In short,
"adequate" compensation owing Chase under international law
did not include add-ons over net asset value - and as such the
correct value was something close to book value. 9
Cuba has two major counterclaims against the United States.
By Cuban law, the Cuban counterclaims must be considered part
of the settlement negotiation process.6 ° It is probable that U.S.
negotiators, under pressure from the Obama administration and
the business lobby to quickly reach a settlement so that relations
with Cuba could be normalized, would agree to use the original
book value figure of $956 million. State Department negotiators
would consider the fact that many of the original U.S. corporate
losses - which account for the bulk of the monetary value of the
claims - were written off long ago.
Settlement would probably be paid pro rata, and could be in
twenty five-year "compensation bonds" paying 2% interest per
annum.6' The Cubans could plausibly argue that bonds are
accepted internationally as compensation for nationalized proper-
ties; the Harvard Draft Convention on International Responsibil-
ity states that payment in bonds of a "fair market value... and
bearing a reasonable rate of interest... and the interest is paid
promptly," is acceptable when the purpose for which the property
was taken was "the furtherance of a general program of economic
and social reform."62 This purpose was specifically recognized by
the U.S. government at the time of the nationalizations.
58. 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
59. Id. at 893.
60. Ley de Reafirmaci6n de la Dignidad y Soberania (Ley 80), 24 de diciembre de
1996, 36 I.L.M. 472 (1997) art. 3.
61. Ley de la Inversi6n Extranjera (Ley 77), 5 de Septiembre de 1995, available at
http://www.icap.cu/medidas/inversion-extranj.html; see also Diaz & Musa, supra note
23, at 890 n.31 (Cuba's approach, as set forth in Article 3 of Law 77, is that such
compensation would be "made in freely convertible currency" and in an amount "equal
to the commercial value [of the asset] established by mutual agreement.").
62. Harvard Draft Convention on International Responsibility of States for
Injuries to Aliens art.10, para. 4, Apr. 15, 1961, Louis B. Sohn & R.R. Baxter Rep.
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The Net Present Value (NPV) of Cuban "compensation bonds"
would probably be worth only a fraction of the certified value of
the claims. Cuba has one of the world's worst bond ratings - Caal
(discount rate range from 15-20%). The NPV of these "compensa-
tion bonds," using a discount rate of 15%, would be roughly 8.30%
of the original certified value of the claims (or 8.3 cents on the
dollar).
While the Federal government has the constitutional author-
ity to settle claims, it may not necessarily choose to do so. In 2007,
the Bush administration stated the following:
The United States has always recognized that all property
claims issues would have to be resolved by a democratic
government of Cuba. In other words, the United States
would not have a direct or immediate role in that. What the
United States has done is compiled lists of people, U.S. citi-
zens who have property claims that they would like to be
able to present once a transition has taken place. But ulti-
mately, those property claims will be determined by a dem-
ocratic government in Cuba.63
X. SPECIAL SITUATIONS FUNDS
If OFAC changes its position on requiring licenses for the
transfer of claims, claim holders may consider sales to interna-
tional special situation funds (specializing in distressed debt) for a
premium over what they could reasonably expect to receive in a
bilateral settlement negotiated by the U.S. government.
While the U.S. Certified Claims against Cuba are not sover-
eign debt per se, they can be compared to Cuban convertible cur-
rency debt. Today, Cuban government debt dating from the
beginning of the 1959 revolution is grouped in a class of debt
instruments known as "hyper-exotics" that are thinly traded on
the international bond market. This tiny sector of the interna-
tional bond market is highly illiquid, with under $1 billion of turn-
over per quarter, representing less that 0.1% of emerging market
debt. Like distressed corporate debt, hyper-exotics can offer spec-
tacular returns. One example is the legal action brought by U.S.
hedge fund Elliott Associates against Peru. This action occurred
after Elliott purchased $11.8 million in distressed Peruvian debt
63. Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary of Commerce & Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere, Briefing On Cuba Policy, Washington,
D.C., U.S. Dept. of State (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.commerce.gov/
NewsRoom/PressReleasesFactSheets/PROD01_004585.
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and forced settlement for almost $58 million after threatening to
attach payments Peru made to other creditors through Euroclear,
a settlements system based in Belgium. 4
Cuba has experienced similar legal actions: when Fidel Cas-
tro returned to Havana following his visit to the September 1960
session of the United Nations General Assembly, he had to use a
hastily borrowed Soviet aircraft because the Cuban plane he
arrived in had been seized on U.S. soil under a court order issued
in Miami against Cuban debts. This was the beginning of many
such seizures over the years, including Cuban state shipping ves-
sels and bank accounts. 5
The annualized returns from successful debt and claims spec-
ulation can be more than 300%.66 Vietnam is a prime example. In
the early 1990s the country's hard currency debt traded at 4 cents
per dollar of face value. By 1996, the Hanoi government had nor-
malized relations with the U.S. and reached a preliminary agree-
ment with the London Club of private creditors. Over this period,
including repayment of past due interest, an initial investment of
4 cents in Vietnamese sovereign debt appreciated to 100 cents.
Other politically induced distressed debt bonanzas include Serbia,
whose rehabilitation from international pariah status saw a five-
fold increase in its debt's market value, and Iraq, whose bond
prices have tripled since October 2002.
Cuban debt turns over just under $1 billion per year and has
a high sensitivity to U.S. relations: in February 1994 prices treb-
led to 33 cents on hopes that President Clinton would promote a
Vietnamese-style reconciliation and subsequently tumbled back to
8 cents. Demand for Cuban debt similarly rose when Fidel Castro
fell ill in 2006 and ceded power to his brother Raul.
Cuba's debt was $16 billion at the end of 2006, of which the
majority of obligations are in default. 7 The price range quoted for
Cuban debt on European exchanges is wide. Trade debt is quoted
as low as 2% of face value, whereas medium-term loans currently
64. Joseph D'Allegro, Collecting on Peru's Sovereign Debt, GLOBAL FIN., Jan. 2001,
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3715/is_200101/ain8945559.
65. See supra text accompanying note 5.
66. A Victory by Default?; Argentina's Successful Debt Restructuring, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 4, 2005.
67. After remaining stable at around $11 billion from 2000 through 2002, Cuba's
foreign debt increased to $12 billion in 2003, $13.8 billion in 2004 and $16 billion by
the close of 2006. Cuba does not recognize nonconvertible currency debt owed to the
former Soviet Union.
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trade at up to 17% of face value .6  A possible "benchmark" to use
in valuing U.S. Certified Claims is Cuban Unrestructured Debt,
representing various types of claims. These types of obligations
are currently trading on the London market at between 5.5% and
11% of face value.69 Due to their similar risk factors to debt
instruments, Cuban claims would probably trade at a steep dis-
count to their nominal value.
A special situations fund would have to acquire a large aggre-
gate amount of claims and hold them until a time in the future -
a "window of opportunity" - when it could settle the claims via a
debt-for-equity or debt-for-property swap with the Cuban govern-
ment. Cuba is known to have negotiated at least two debt-for-
asset swaps with private concerns (Mexican and Argentine) to set-
tle sovereign debt purchased at a steep discount. The fund would
have to legally remove the claims from U.S. jurisdiction to (a)
counter the risk that the U.S. Government could take the claims
from private owners under the Doctrine of Espousal and settle
them arbitrarily in the frenzy to quickly normalize relations with
Cuba; and (b) to allow the fund to accept Cuban property as com-
pensation, which is currently prohibited to U.S. nationals unless
authorized by OFAC.
XI. CONCLUSION
The precedent of U.S. claims programs suggests that the fed-
eral government will eventually enter into bilateral settlement
negotiations with Cuba as part of a broader diplomatic effort to
normalize relations. While Helms-Burton and other sanctions leg-
islation would present a legal impediment for the Cuban govern-
ment (which will probably not be "democratic" in the U.S. sense,
but will likely follow the Vietnamese or Chinese model of a one-
party, officially socialist state with a market economy), such laws
could be repealed or amended. 0
68. Courtesy of Jurriaan Braat, Manager, Omni Bridgeway Emerging Markets
Limited, London (Apr. 16, 2008).
69. Courtesy of Mr. Stephen Monks, Managing Director, Exotix Ltd., London
(Sept. 17, 2007).
70. U.S. law defines the criteria for a democratic Cuban government as one that
"results from free and fair elections conducted under internationally recognized
observers; has permitted opposition parties ample time to organize for such elections
and permitted full access to the media to all candidates; shows respect for civil
liberties and human rights; has made demonstrable progress in establishing an
independent judiciary; is moving towards establishing a market-oriented economic
system; and has made or is committed to making constitutional changes that would
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Cuba has no realistic means of paying cash compensation to
settle U.S. claims unless the negotiated amount was a mere pit-
tance to achieve an accord and satisfaction under international
law. According to Ambassador Stuart Eisenstat, former U.S. Sec-
retary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs,
and Special Envoy for Property Claims in Central and Eastern
Europe, who was President Clinton's special envoy on Cuba: "Set-
tling the thousands of claims pending against Cuba should not be
much of an obstacle to normalization -when that day finally
comes. Given Cuba's poor economic state, any compensation
received by claimants may be little more than token payments."'"
In the end, owners of U.S. Certified Claims against Cuba
(including corporate successors in interest and grandchildren of
the original private claimants) would probably receive Cuban
bonds of minimal value in compensation whether they pursue the
time and expense of litigation in a Cuban court, or wait for the
U.S. government to settle on their behalf. The optimal solution for
all stakeholders may be a private sector settlement via a special
situations fund that avoids contentious and protracted diplomatic
negotiation.
ensure regular free and fair elections." Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C.
§ 6007(a) (1992).
71. Ambassador Stuart Eisenstat, Speaking on Cuban Claims, National Public
Radio (June 9, 2007).
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